Image: Generated by AI with ChatGPT (OpenAI), September 2025
A Chinese national from Wuhan, Chengxuan Han, pleaded no contest in federal court to smuggling biological materials into the United States and lying to U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers. Han, a Ph.D. student at Huazhong University of Science and Technology, shipped multiple packages containing concealed specimens, including roundworms, to a University of Michigan laboratory in 2024 and 2025.
Authorities discovered the shipments when Han arrived at Detroit Metropolitan Airport on June 8, 2025. She denied involvement and had deleted data from her devices, but later admitted to sending the packages and lying to border officials.
Federal prosecutors stressed the seriousness of bypassing import regulations and misleading authorities. The case underscored concerns about the People’s Republic of China exploiting U.S. research institutions. Han faces up to 20 years for smuggling and five for false statements, with sentencing scheduled for September 10, 2025. The U.S. Attorney’s Office criticized the University of Michigan for inviting Han as a visiting scholar, highlighting vulnerabilities in academic oversight.
China’s espionage operations are now considered the most aggressive in American history. Hackers have penetrated government, private companies, and critical infrastructure while human spies operate inside the U.S. One example was a secret “police station” in Manhattan’s Chinatown, shut down in 2022. Its purpose was to intimidate dissidents; two men were charged as unregistered Chinese agents. More than 140 people have been indicted in recent years for spying, harassment, or influence operations, including a former aide to New York’s governor accused of taking millions to sway policy.
The case of Shujun Wang illustrates Beijing’s infiltration of diaspora communities. Wang, a 75-year-old Queens resident and naturalized citizen, co-founded a pro-democracy group while secretly reporting to China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) for nearly two decades. Prosecutors showed he gathered information on activists and delivered it through meetings in China, encrypted communications, and “diary” reports.
His espionage began in 2006 and targeted Hong Kong democracy activists, Taiwanese independence advocates, and Uyghur and Tibetan supporters. He lied to investigators between 2017 and 2021, including during an interview at JFK Airport. Convicted of acting as an unregistered agent, making false statements, and unlawfully holding dissidents’ information, he faces up to 25 years in prison.
Colleagues were shocked by Wang’s betrayal. Prosecutors said he passed along names and private details of activists, while his lawyers argued he lacked access to classified information and was scapegoated after refusing to cooperate. Federal officials countered that his actions endangered lives and were part of Beijing’s campaign of transnational repression.
Chinese dissidents in America remain key targets. Activists such as Anna Yeung-Cheung and Anna Kwok have endured harassment and threats of abduction. Kwok, who leads a pro-democracy group, lives under constant fear after Hong Kong authorities placed a $130,000 bounty on her. Although the Trump administration sanctioned officials behind such repression, both women note China’s reach extends far beyond its borders.
Though Wang avoided prison due to health issues, analysts say his case shows how Beijing relies on ordinary individuals, not “James Bond” types, to monitor and intimidate critics. If an expendable figure like Wang could operate undetected for years, it suggests more valuable assets remain hidden.
A report from the National Counterintelligence and Security Center calls China the top espionage threat to U.S. universities and research. Beijing aggressively targets science and technology, particularly AI, semiconductors, quantum computing, optics, hypersonics, and energy systems. Since the 1990s, it has built a system to exploit overseas students through state scholarships, return obligations, and transnational networks that pressure those abroad to share knowledge. This “military-civil fusion” strategy blurs civilian and military innovation.
Cases show how research is exploited. One U.S. professor shared genetic data later used by Chinese authorities to surveil Uyghurs. Other incidents include Chinese students threatening democracy activists and posing as classmates to collect intelligence on peers likely to enter government service.
Ji Chaoqun, a Chinese student who joined the U.S. Army, was convicted of helping the MSS identify aerospace engineers for recruitment. Harvard professor Charles Lieber concealed ties to China’s Thousand Talents Program while securing millions in federal research funding, and several universities were fined for undisclosed ties to Huawei.
The MSS, the world’s largest spy agency, prioritizes monitoring Chinese citizens abroad. In the U.S., this includes WeChat surveillance, informants in communities and campuses, and recruitment through bribery, intimidation, and “honeypots.” The MSS also leverages threats to family members in China, a coercive tactic unavailable to Western agencies.
The MSS bolsters its image with propaganda videos serving as both recruitment tools and warnings of its global reach. In response, the CIA launched Chinese-language campaigns to encourage defections, tapping into fears for families left in China. Former diplomat Jim Lewis warned that China’s repression should concern all, arguing that regimes that mistreat their own citizens extend the same abuse abroad.
Although Russia and Cuba also target U.S. academia, China’s persistence makes it the greatest danger to national security and technological competitiveness. From 2011 to 2018, over 90 percent of U.S. economic espionage cases involved China. Analysts warn that admitting more PRC students, as discussed in recent trade talks, would increase the risk, since even the current 277,000 students in STEM fields provide ample opportunities for exploitation.
U.S. universities are “turbocharging” China’s military buildup by granting access to sensitive research. Given the espionage threat, visas for PRC students should be reconsidered.
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